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Introduction and summary
A byproduct of improved information technology has 
been a loss of privacy. Personal information that was 
once confined to dusty archives can now be readily 
obtained from proprietary data services, or it may be 
freely available (and, as Facebook users know, often 
voluntarily provided and accessible) through the Internet. 
While the increased collection and dissemination of per-
sonal data have undoubtedly provided economic bene-
fits, they have also diminished people’s sense of privacy 
and, in some cases, given rise to new types of crime.
Is this loss of privacy good or bad? Press accounts 
repeatedly argue the latter: Too much data are being 
collected in ways that are too easy for criminals to ac-
cess.1 But in a thought-provoking essay, Swire (2003) 
argues that a meaningful answer to this question requires 
some notion of efficient confidentiality of personal 
data—that is, of a degree of privacy that properly bal-
ances the costs and benefits of our newfound loss of 
anonymity. In this article, we explore the concept of 
efficient confidentiality, using some ideas from eco-
nomic theory.
Loss of privacy: The costs are large and 
easy to find
The most dramatic consequence of the increased 
availability of personal information has been the emer-
gence of a new form of payment fraud, identity theft. 
The 1998 U.S. Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence 
Act (ITADA) defines identity theft as the knowing 
transfer, possession, or usage of any name or number 
that identifies another person, with the intent of com-
mitting or aiding or abetting a crime. Traditional vari-
eties of identity theft, such as check forgery, have long 
flourished, but over the last decade, identity theft has 
become a major category of crime and a significant 
policy issue.2
Identity theft takes many guises, but it is divided 
into two general categories: existing account fraud 
and new account fraud. Existing account fraud occurs 
when a thief uses an existing credit card or similar  
account information to illicitly obtain money or goods. 
New account fraud (traditionally) occurs when a thief 
makes use of another individual’s personal informa-
tion to open one or more new accounts in the victim’s 
name. Both types of identity theft depend on easy ac-
cess to other people’s data.
Today, identity theft is big business. A study con-
ducted by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), en-
compassing both new account fraud and existing account 
fraud, indicates that in 2006 identity thieves stole about 
$49.3 billion from U.S. consumers.3 When the time and 
out-of-pocket costs incurred to resolve the crime are 
added in, identity theft cost U.S. consumers $61 billion 
in 2006 (Schreft, 2007). Even this is a conservative 
estimate, however, as it omits certain categories of 
identity theft and some types of costs that are not gen-
erally known to consumers. For example, an increas-
ingly prevalent type of identity theft is fictitious or 
synthetic identity fraud, in which a thief combines in-
formation taken from a variety of sources to open ac-
counts in the name of a new fictitious identity (Cheney, 
2005; and Coggeshall, 2007). There is no single victim, 
in contrast to traditional types of identity theft, but re-
tailers and ultimately consumers end up bearing the cost.
Much of the data used in identity theft is obtained 
through low-tech channels. In consumer surveys,  23 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
victims who know how their identifying information 
was stolen commonly attribute identity theft to stolen 
wallets or mail or to personal acquaintance with the 
identity thief (Kim, 2008). In these same surveys, how-
ever, the large majority of identity theft victims are 
unable to pinpoint how the thief obtained their data. 
Available evidence suggests that much of these data 
are obtained through illicit access (called “breaches”) 
of commercial or government databases.
Statistics on data breaches are available from infor-
mation security websites, such as Attrition.org and the 
Identity Theft Resource Center (www.idtheftcenter.org). 
Certainly data breaches are numerous and increasing: 
Attrition.org lists 326 reported data breach “incidents” 
for 2007, leading to the compromise of 162 million 
records of personal data, as compared with 11 reported 
incidents and 6 million compromised records in 2003.4 
These numbers must be placed in perspective. A data 
breach does not necessarily lead to identity theft, and one 
reason for the upsurge in reported breaches is the spread 
of state laws that require consumer notification when a 
data breach occurs (Anderson, Durbin, and Salinger, 
2008). Nevertheless, there is widespread recognition 
that data breaches promote identity theft. A strong 
demonstration of this can be found in the August 2008 
indictment of an 11-person, global identity theft ring, 
responsible for the theft of 41 million credit card and 
debit card numbers, as well as hundreds of millions 
of dollars in fraud losses.5
The benefits of loss of privacy:  
More subtle, but substantial
 If identity theft costs the U.S. economy so much, 
are there offsetting benefits? To try and make sense of 
this question, we will employ a branch of economics 
known as monetary theory. Broadly speaking, mone-
tary theory seeks to understand how transactions are 
structured within an economy. 
The classic model of monetary theory was pro-
posed by Knut Wicksell (1935). Wicksell’s model 
economy is depicted in figure 1 and consists of only 
three individuals: Andy, Bob, and Clyde (A, B, and C, 
for short). Andy can produce a good valued by Bob, 
Bob can produce a good valued by Clyde, and Clyde 
can produce a good valued by Andy. The point of 
Wicksell’s model is that in real-world economies, trans-
actions typically happen between people who cannot 
deal through simple barter. For example, when Andy 
and Bob meet, Bob would like to purchase Andy’s good, 
but the good that Bob has available to trade is only 
valued by Clyde. How should exchange proceed? 
One way to solve this problem is through the use 
of cash. Suppose that A and B meet on every Monday, 
B and C meet on every Wednesday, and A and C on 
Fridays. Then if everyone agrees that the goods they 
exchange are each worth $1, the economy can function 
perfectly well with a “money supply” of two dollar bills.6 
For example, Bob sells his good to Clyde on every 
Wednesday, earning a dollar that he uses to buy Andy’s 
good the following Monday. Andy uses this dollar to 
buy a good from Clyde every Friday, and so on. This 
“Wicksell triangle” shows how cash can function as a 
sort of recordkeeping system for transactions within 
an economy; every dollar that someone spends is proof 
of an earlier sale by the same person.7
Cash has some well-known limitations, however—
some of which appear even in the context of this simple 
model. For example, if Clyde gets sick or otherwise 
fails to show up one Wednesday, then Bob will have 
no money with which to make next Monday’s purchase. 
In practice, cash has other drawbacks, including risk 
of counterfeit or theft, the inconvenience of finding 
an automated teller machine (ATM), limited usefulness 
in telephone and Internet transactions, and the fact 
that it does not pay interest.
The alternative to cash is credit. In Wicksell’s model 
economy, cash would not be needed if A, B, and C could 
get together and agree that each individual would re-
ceive a good of their preferred type, so long as they 
had provided a good to someone else the previous week. 
That way, if an individual occasionally was unable to 
sell his good during one week, he could still purchase 
goods on the expectation that he would resume sales the 
following week. The value of this additional exchange 
of goods, beyond what would be possible if all trans-
actions were only in cash, is known as a credit benefit. 
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Wicksell triangle
Note: See the text for further details.
Source: Wicksell (1935).
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Paying by credit has other advantages, which are the 
“mirror image” of the disadvantages of cash: fewer 
trips to the bank, less liability in case of theft, ease in 
transactions at a distance, and the reduced need to 
carry non-interest-bearing cash.8
Any estimate of the total credit benefit in an econ-
omy is somewhat speculative, since it involves the com-
parison of the value of exchange in an actual economy 
to the value of exchange in a hypothetical economy 
where only cash is available for most transactions.9 
For a developed economy such as that of the U.S., how-
ever, this benefit is almost certainly quite large. For 
example, in 2006 (the year of the FTC identity theft 
survey), U.S. residents made about $3 trillion in pur-
chases, using credit and debit cards.10 If the credit ben-
efit of these transactions alone (ignoring other types 
of credit transactions) amounted to, say, just 5 percent 
of their total value, the resulting benefit to the overall 
economy would be $150 billion—more than enough 
to outweigh the estimated costs of identity theft.
In the rest of this article, we will argue that some 
loss of privacy is central to the provision of this credit 
benefit.
Identity: Real and transactional
In Wicksell’s model economy, there’s no chance 
of identity theft. Andy, Bob, and Clyde are well known 
to one another, and as long as one of their mutual friends 
(say, Dave) can keep a tally of who’s provided a good 
to whom, it would be easy to maintain a credit-based 
system of exchange. This system would be self-enforcing, 
since any shirking by one party would quickly be not-
ed by Dave and immediately become apparent to the 
other parties.11 Such informal credit systems are com-
mon among friends and families, in primitive societies, 
and in other settings with limited social interactions.
But most transactions in today’s economy are  
either between 1) parties who are total strangers, and/
or 2) parties who feel no particular sense of obligation 
toward one another. Credit in such situations requires 
some system to control two types of risk. The first 
type of risk is credit risk—the risk that the purchaser 
may not repay the debt incurred. Overcoming credit 
risk requires a way to keep track of “credit histories,” 
that is, a way to restrict the use of credit to people 
who habitually pay their bills. The second type of risk 
is fraud risk—the risk of deception by the purchaser. 
Overcoming fraud risk requires a way to associate 
transactors with credit histories: For example, I may 
have a spotless credit record, but somehow that infor-
mation has to be conveyed to the grocery store before 
I’m allowed to leave the store with a bag of groceries. 
To be effective, both types of services require the  
accumulation, storage, and distribution of large amounts 
of personal data. But the data required by the second 
service concern a person’s identity, and are bound to 
be of a more confidential and controversial nature.12
“Identity” in general refers to all the distinguish-
ing attributes of an individual—potentially a very 
long list. The term personal identifying data (PID) is 
used to describe some portion of a person’s identity—
name, birth date, Social Security number, etc.—that 
is readily observable by others. In order to distinguish 
individuals, the credit bureaus, credit card companies, 
data brokers, and other parties in the credit industry 
have compiled large databases of PID. These subsets 
of a person’s “real” identity that are stored by these 
parties and used in transacting can be thought of as 
transactional identities (Schreft, 2007). Once the rel-
evant data have been verified, a person’s transactional 
identity may be augmented by the creation of new, 
synthetic data unique to that person, such as a credit 
card number, PIN (personal identification number), 
and so on (Kahn and Roberds, 2008).
A typical credit transaction—say, a purchase of a 
bag of groceries, using a credit or debit card—can be 
thought of as a merchant exchanging goods in return 
for two essential pieces of payment information cor-
responding to the types of risk described previously: 
1) that the purchaser, based on his credit history, is 
likely to pay his bill13 and 2) that the purchaser’s trans-
actional identity is genuine so that the consumer is 
not a fraudster. 
Transactional identities as club goods
All credit-based payments require systems for 
processing valuable information. We can think of this 
information (credit histories and transactional identi-
ties) as economic goods, or items having value in ex-
change. These goods have value, since they facilitate 
the exchange of other goods (say, groceries) that peo-
ple want to consume. Electronic versions of payment 
data, once amassed, can be stored at a few locations 
and then shared among payment system participants 
at very low cost. The data used in credit-based trans-
actions meet Varian’s (1998) description of a digital 
good, a good that can be stored and transferred in 
digital form.
Digital goods are also nonrival goods, meaning 
that they are not diminished by successive use. This 
distinguishes them from rival goods, such as cars and 
cornflakes; one individual’s consumption of a rival 
good diminishes or eliminates the possibility of an-
other person consuming it. Other examples of digital 
(and also nonrival) goods are given by the electronic 
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cable television, computer programming, or recorded 
music and video: For instance, my consumption of an 
episode of American Idol does not diminish another’s 
enjoyment of the same episode. The same holds true 
with payment data, including transactional identities: 
The fact that Wal-Mart knows that I am not a fraud-
ster does not diminish the value of the same informa-
tion to Home Depot.
Nonrival goods are classified as club goods or 
public goods. A club good is an excludable nonrival 
good—that is, one for which a group or individual 
can be excluded from consuming (for example, cable 
TV programming).14 A public good is a nonexcludable 
nonrival good—that is, one for which access cannot 
be limited (for example, national defense or clean 
air). The club good classification is more appropriate 
for payment information, since access to this infor-
mation can be controlled (to a greater or lesser degree).
The “nonrivalness” of electronic payment infor-
mation is a tremendous source of economic efficiency. 
Turning the clock back several decades, in any retail 
situation involving credit, a merchant had to independent-
ly come by the information needed to assess a customer’s 
creditworthiness. The high cost of this information 
meant that credit was impractical in many situations, 
for example, during travel or for small transactions. 
The development of the credit industry (the large  
databases of credit histories and transactional identi-
ties, credit and debit cards, electronic authorization pro-
cedures, and antifraud technologies) has meant that 
merchants can take advantage of economies of scale 
in managing this information, and has spread the costs 
of information management over a larger group of 
merchants (and, ultimately, consumers).15 This has, in 
turn, increased the credit benefit available to society 
as a whole.
Of course, the transformation of payment informa-
tion into a nonrival good has not occurred in isolation. 
All kinds of data (music, video, maps, encyclopedias, 
and celebrity gossip) have been widely digitized, and 
thanks to the essentially nonrival nature of digital goods, 
they are rapidly accumulated and widely disseminated. 
The dark side of nonrivalness
A central feature of any digital good is its quality. 
Recorded music or video, for example, is useless if the 
original is garbled. A potentially interesting website may 
seem less so if it is known to harbor computer viruses. 
Quality is especially critical for payment data because 
people using a payment system expect it to work flaw-
lessly virtually 100 percent of the time. Contamination 
of a payment system’s data through even a few errors 
or instances of fraud can quickly erode its value.
A “dark side” of the efficient production of pay-
ment information is that it can compromise quality; 
that is, it can facilitate fraudulent activity as well as  
legitimate use. Once a fraudster has assumed another 
person’s transactional identity (through either new or 
existing account fraud), the fraudster becomes an ap-
parently legitimate participant in one or more payment 
systems and, by extension, a legitimate participant in 
the eyes of many participants in those systems. This 
vulnerability means that payment data, as an economic 
good, will only have value in the presence of the com-
plementary good “data integrity,” which is the quality 
and reliability of the data incorporated into the pay-
ment system (Braun et al., 2008).16 Data integrity, like 
the underlying payment data, is a nonrival (club) good: 
The assurance that a payment information database is 
secure against data breaches is not diminished by suc-
cessive use.
Another widely recognized drawback of modern 
payment arrangements stems from the more difficult 
to measure, but nonetheless important, consequences 
of diminished privacy. That is, the digitization of per-
sonal data contained in transactional identities has 
made these data available to many more people than 
ever before, often with negative consequences. These 
may take the form of intangible, but undeniable, costs 
in terms of people’s loss of a “sense of space” about 
their personal lives. Or, for victims of identity theft, 
these costs may assume a more concrete form, through 
harassment by bill collectors, misplaced civil lawsuits, 
or even criminal investigations. 
Many current payments and credit practices can 
be interpreted as attempts to partly restore the sense 
of privacy that may have existed in earlier times. When 
someone makes a purchase with a credit card, for ex-
ample, that purchaser must effectively reveal some 
information to the merchant concerning his transactional 
identity—at least in the form of a relatively anonymous 
credit card number. This “surrender” of information 
represents a compromise between the merchant’s need 
to identify the purchaser and the purchaser’s desire to 
preserve his own privacy. Ideally, the merchant obtains 
enough information about the purchaser to determine 
that the transaction is legitimate, but no more. Con-
sumers themselves have also undertaken forceful ac-
tions to safeguard their privacy, removing their names 
from public directories and mailboxes, installing paper 
shredders in their homes, and only giving out person-
al information to the most trusted parties.
Ironically, these very attempts to restore privacy 
may have contributed to the rise of identity theft, ac-
cording to LoPucki (2003). LoPucki points out that in 
earlier times, individuals’ access to credit often depended 26 1Q/2009, Economic Perspectives
on their public persona, that is, on their standing 
within a local community or circle of business associ-
ates. Those seeking access to credit had to sacrifice 
much of their privacy (say, by socializing with their 
neighbors on a regular basis or joining civic organiza-
tions) in order to gain a reputation as an upstanding 
and creditworthy individual. Modern information 
technology, by enabling “instant credit” between  
relatively anonymous parties, has reduced the need 
for a public persona, but it has also multiplied the  
potential for fraud. 
Efficient confidentiality: Beyond supply  
and demand
Using the ideas outlined thus far, we can now 
look at the issue of efficient confidentiality. The term 
confidentiality has a specific meaning in our context, 
which is the likelihood that a person’s transactional 
identity will not be observed by miscreants and put to 
inappropriate use. A person’s confidentiality can be 
thought of an economic good, whose provision in the 
marketplace depends on two other economic goods: 
1) the amount of PID incorporated into that person’s 
transactional identity and 2) the level of security for 
these data, or the degree of data integrity applied to 
the person’s transactional identity. An increase in the 
second good always improves confidentiality. An in-
crease in the first good can improve confidentiality, 
up to a point. The more data that are collected (all else 
being equal), the more precise the identification of in-
dividuals is, and hence, the greater the availability of 
credit-based payment is throughout the economy. But 
increasing the amount of PID collected (again, all else 
being equal) reduces privacy and can also amplify the 
negative consequences that occur when such data are 
misused, eroding confidentiality.
How should we know if these two goods (data 
collection and data security) are being efficiently pro-
vided? Textbook economic theory says that for many 
goods, it is (conceptually, at least) easy to describe how 
that good can be efficiently provided: An efficient market 
exists for a good when its supply curve intersects with 
its demand curve. The demand curve for a good, in turn, 
is given by its marginal benefit to buyers, and the supply 
curve is determined by sellers’ marginal cost of pro-
ducing that good. In a competitive industry, if the price 
of a good is above (below) its marginal cost, produc-
ers enter (leave) the industry until efficiency prevails.
Unfortunately this familiar model doesn’t work 
for digital goods, since their marginal cost is practi-
cally zero. Instead, a more typical pattern for digital 
goods is for there to be competition among a few 
large producers, which are able to take advantage  
of the extensive economies of scale in these goods’ 
production (think of the computer software and enter-
tainment industries). Prices remain above marginal 
costs, so as to defray the costs of production.
We see the same pattern in the construction of 
transactional identities by a relatively small number 
of large players such as credit bureaus, credit card net-
works, and card issuing banks.17 Through the accumula-
tion of large amounts of PID, these organizations attempt 
to meet the demand for transactional identities that 
exists in the market economy. Just as with other digi-
tal goods, such as computer software and recorded 
video, it is hard to know whether these data are being 
efficiently collected and priced.18
The situation is different when we turn to the is-
sue of data integrity. Because payment data are only 
useful if they are communicated (in some form), these 
data must be touched by a large number of hands to 
be of any value. A real-world list of such hands would 
include consumers, merchants, credit bureaus, banks, 
and payment processors. In other words, efficient pro-
duction of data integrity, a club good, requires the co-
operative efforts of a large number of “club members.” 
Large clubs often promote efficiency because 
they allow for economies of scale in the production 
of a good. But within large clubs, conflicts of interest 
can arise as to the amount of the good that should be 
provided. This is especially true for goods such as 
data integrity, for which the “weakest link” or “flood 
control” model of a nonrival good is often applicable 
(Hirshleifer, 1983).
For a weakest link good, the total amount of the 
good provided to the club is equal to the lowest amount 
of the good supplied by a club member (the weakest 
link in a chain, or the lowest levee in a flood control 
system). The idea of a weakest link is consistent with 
many press accounts of identity theft, in which a data 
breach at a single retailer or payment processor leads 
to widespread fraud. There is a natural tendency to 
supply an inefficiently small amount of a weakest link 
good (Varian, 2004), which can arise from the follow-
ing conflict: A club member with relatively little at 
stake will tend to put less effort into providing the club 
good than a club member with a lot at stake. This ten-
sion is present in many situations involving data se-
curity (Anderson and Moore, 2006). 
Recent changes in the payments industry’s security 
practices can be seen as a response to this problem. 
For example, a set of industry-wide data security 
standards—the PCI (Payment Card Industry) standards 
(www.pcisecuritystandards.org)—has been created as 
a way of strengthening the weakest links in the data 
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lines has been the increasingly common practice of 
merchants quickly disposing of payment data, rather 
than storing it for an extended period of time.19
An additional source of inefficiency comes from 
externalities (also called spillovers) across data security 
practices. An externality occurs when the consumption 
or production of a good by one party affects another’s, 
conferring benefits or costs on the other party. A neg-
ative externality results when a party does not take 
into account the full cost of his action to others. 
In the context of data security, the potential for 
negative externalities exists for at least two reasons. 
First, as noted previously, payment data often passes 
through many hands, so it is difficult to determine 
how an identity thief was able to access the necessary 
data. Second, under current U.S. and Canadian laws, 
recovering the costs of a data breach through the courts 
can be difficult (Schreft, 2007; and Chandler, 2008). 
Either way, if payment data are stolen from one party 
and used to commit identity theft with costly conse-
quences for another, the first party may not expect to 
pay the full costs of the breach. Taken together, these 
complications suggest that there are obstacles to the 
efficient provision of data integrity in the marketplace. 
Because payment system participants may not fully 
take into account all of the costs associated with their 
security practices, this can lead to underprovision of 
data security. This would, in turn, imply an inefficiently 
low level of confidentiality in the marketplace, even 
if the market is collecting the “right” amount of PID.
In Roberds and Schreft (2008), we present a model 
that shows how this inefficiency could be exacerbated 
by the interaction between PID collection and data 
security. If some payment systems are not adequately 
securing their data and other payment systems are alerted 
to this, then each system’s best safeguard against iden-
tity theft may be to increase the amount of PID it uses 
for transactional identities. Under these circumstances, 
gathering more PID can reduce fraud, but doing this 
is inefficient because it further reduces confidentiality. 
Roles for regulation
The previous discussion points to a role for public 
policy. If the markets for information on transactional 
identities are providing inefficiently low levels of con-
fidentiality, there may be ways for well-designed pol-
icies to improve on market outcomes. 
One policy implication that is not supported is 
government entry into the markets for payment infor-
mation. As with other types of club goods, the exclud-
ability of payment information provides a profit 
incentive to motivate ongoing improvements in effi-
ciency. But the production of club goods is rarely a 
straightforward business, and it is usually subject to 
extensive policy interventions. Electronic entertain-
ment products, computer software, and various types 
of Internet content, to name just three examples, are 
frequent subjects of public controversy, legislation, 
regulation, and litigation.
This same general pattern is found in the markets 
for payment information. Various pieces of legislation 
and regulatory efforts have sought to address the “weak-
est link” and “spillover” problems identified before, 
but have stopped short of trying to micromanage in-
dustry practices. For example, the Fair and Accurate 
Credit Transactions Act of 2003 (commonly known 
as the FACT Act) seeks to increase the industry stan-
dards for minimally acceptable security practices. The 
FACT Act requires banks and other creditors to develop 
procedures to respond to account activity that could 
reasonably be interpreted as evidence of identity theft 
(“red flags”), but does not specify the details of how 
this should be done.20
In the same vein, a number of state laws now re-
quire that consumers be notified whenever their data 
are breached. One motivation for this requirement is 
to enable quicker detection of identity theft by con-
sumers. An equally important purpose for this require-
ment, though, may be to motivate better security 
practices by increasing the costs of a data breach (in 
terms of both dollars and reputation). A number of 
states have taken another tack, which is to allow con-
sumers to limit or “freeze” access to their credit re-
ports, that is, to limit access to information on their 
transactional identities.
A concern with this type of regulation is the cost 
of compliance. Since securing data is costly, perfect 
confidentiality of personal data cannot be an efficient 
outcome, and should not be a goal of sensible regula-
tion. As outlined in this article, some amount of iden-
tity theft is inevitable given modern information 
technology. Eliminating identity theft entirely would 
not be possible without eliminating the efficient shar-
ing of information at the heart of our modern credit 
and payment systems. 
Public goods
Government intervention is traditionally viewed 
as beneficial when it yields public goods. One such 
good is “public security,” as is provided by the crimi-
nal justice system. The ITADA and various state laws 
have sought to discourage identity theft by imposing 
severe criminal penalties—a form of deterrence not 
available to the private sector.
The nature of identity theft puts limits on the ef-
fectiveness of criminal sanctions, however. By stealing 28 1Q/2009, Economic Perspectives
someone else’s payment data, an identity thief gains 
that person’s access to credit in largely anonymous 
situations, such as in purchases over the Internet. This 
same anonymity that benefits legitimate purchasers 
(in terms of access to credit with increased confiden-
tiality) makes criminal prosecution of identity theft 
impossible in many cases—as when the identity thief 
is located in a different country from that of the victim. 
Another noteworthy public good in this context 
is that of overall “confidence” in credit and payment 
systems. As discussed previously, people do not like 
to use payment systems without something close to 
100 percent reliability. If incidences of identity theft 
and data breaches were to become sufficiently com-
mon, the result could be a loss of this public good—
that is, a loss of confidence not only in the directly 
affected parties, but in credit-based payment more 
generally (Braun et al., 2008). One rationale for recent 
regulatory actions in the payments area is that, apart 
from the effects of any specific provisions, these laws 
and regulations demonstrate governments’ commitment 
to maintain a reasonable standard for confidentiality 
of payment information. 
Conclusion
In this article, we have looked at the issue of con-
fidentiality of personal information from the standpoint 
of economic theory. Some loss of privacy is necessary 
for the credit benefit, which is a key advantage of 
modern payment systems. By consolidating personal 
information into transactional identities, information 
technology now allows people to enjoy this credit 
benefit in circumstances that would have been unthink-
able a generation ago.
The sharing of information on transactional iden-
tities is vital to the operation of these payment systems. 
However, this information sharing can facilitate fraud 
in the form of identity theft. Information sharing can 
also create conflicts of interest that may not be easily 
resolved through the operation of the marketplace. 
Thoughtful public policy should be aimed at resolving 
these conflicts and providing public goods. The ultimate 
goal of regulation should not be absolute privacy of 
consumers or complete suppression of identity theft,  
but instead the promotion of efficient confidentiality 
of personal information. 
NOTES
1See, for example, Stone (2007), Swartz and Acohido (2007), 
Caruso (2007), and Dow Jones and Company Inc. (2008b).
2There are no time-series data on identity theft rates, but one mea-
sure of the extent of the problem is the how often the term “identi-
ty theft” shows up in press reports. Anderson, Durbin, and Salinger 
(2008) report 30 mentions of “identity theft” in U.S. newspapers in 
1995; 2,000 in 2000; and 12,000 in 2005.
3This estimate is from a survey of consumers reported in Synovate 
(2007); for extensive discussions of this survey, see Schreft (2007) 
and Anderson, Durbin, and Salinger (2008).
4Of course not all data breaches are publicized, so these numbers 
are probably underestimated.
5See, for example, Stone (2008). For other recent data breach inci-
dents, see Braun et al. (2008).
6If we increase “money velocity” by changing the order of transac-
tions (say A and C meet on Wednesdays and B and C on Fridays), 
then a money supply of one dollar bill will be sufficient.
7Beginning with Kiyotaki and Wright (1989), this role for cash  
has been extensively developed in “search” models of money; 
Wright (2008) surveys this literature.
8For a detailed comparison of the costs of cash versus other forms 
of payments in certain retail settings, see Garcia-Swartz, Hahn, and 
Layne-Farrar (2006).
9Even for the simple Wicksell model, calculation of a credit benefit 
can be a challenging exercise. Taub (1994) shows that for this model, 
people can sometimes do just as well by keeping hoards of cash. 
However, Kocherlakota (1998) shows that in general an economy’s 
credit benefit will be a positive number.
10Bank for International Settlements, Committee on Payment and 
Settlement Systems of the Group of Ten Countries (2008). Use of a 
debit card can result in a credit benefit if the card is attached to a 
bank account with an overdraft privilege or line of credit.
11In some simple economies like Wicksell’s, Araujo (2004) shows 
that Dave may not be needed; mutual confidence that others will 
honor their obligations is enough to sustain credit-based exchange. 
Kahn and Roberds (2009) discuss how Wicksell’s model can be 
used to analyze various types of payment systems.
12 Credit risk and fraud risk are often difficult to separate. For example, 
if a person applies for a credit card, runs up a bill, and then never 
makes a payment, then it may be hard to tell whether the person 
meant to commit fraud or just wasn’t able to pay. Or someone may 
refuse to pay for his credit card purchase, claiming the transaction 
was fraudulent; this practice is sometimes known as “friendly 
fraud.” Nonetheless, it is useful to conceptually distinguish be-
tween these two types of risk.
13There is an element of credit even with many transactions that are 
thought of as “instantaneous” (for example, debit card or Internet 
banking payments), since these do not settle instantaneously. In 
many card transactions, the card issuer assumes the “credit risk” 
that the card payment will not be repaid by the cardholder.29 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
14For example, one can imagine all viewers of ESPN (Entertainment 
and Sports Programming Network) as members of a club who pay 
membership fees to the club through their monthly cable or satel-
lite television bill.
15An economy of scale occurs when an increase in the production 
of a good lowers its average cost. In our context, the increased ac-
cumulation and distribution of payment information have lowered 
the average cost of accessing such information.
16A complementary good is defined as a good that is consumed 
with a second good, for which an increase in the demand for the 
first good results in an increase in demand for the second. For ex-
ample, cars and gasoline are complementary goods.
17The structure of this industry has been changed by the emergence 
of data brokers (legal and illegal) and other entities that compile 
and trade PID obtained from other sources (Schreft, 2007).
18For example, one could interpret the famous antitrust case brought 
by Wal-Mart and other retailers against Visa and MasterCard, set-
tled in 2003 for $3 billion, as a dispute over the efficient pricing of 
access to payment information, including the validity of cardhold-
ers’ transactional identities.
19This practice of merchants quickly disposing of payment data has 
been incorporated into the PCI standards; the practice came about 
in part because of legislation discussed later in this article. See, for 
example, Dow Jones and Company Inc. (2008a).
20More specific guidelines were jointly issued by six federal regula-
tory agencies, including the Federal Reserve System, in 2007. See 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Federal Reserve System, 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Office of Thrift Supervision, 
National Credit Union Administration, and Federal Trade 
Commission (2007). 
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